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I. INTRODUCTION
This piece quickly overviews the history of the Uniform Probate
Code ("UPC" or "Code")' and then proceeds to analyze selected
* © Copyright Lawrence H. Averill, Jr. Professor of Law and former Dean, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock. Professor Averill was Administrative Assistant to Chief Justice Rehn-
quist between 1989-1991. He is also the author of Uniform Probate Code in a Nutshell. See
LAWRENCE H. AVERILL, JR., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1987).
' See infra notes 13-55 and accompanying text.
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physical and substantive attributes of the UPC. As the UPC has been
called an eclectic system, 2 this Article is an eclectic analysis. Al-
though it includes a short historical review and critical analysis of the
old and new Code, it is neither a comprehensive history, nor a ple-
nary analysis of the 1990 UPC. As an experienced advocate for the
Code, I offer some suggestions concerning its promotion and the dis-
semination of information concerning the Code. Additionally, this
Article discusses the physical format of the 1990 UPC,4 as well as the
policy 5 and formalism 6 aspects of the new Code.
Over the last twenty-plus years, I have spent countless hours pe-
rusing the Code and comparing it with the laws of several jurisdic-
tions.7 Much time was spent in committee meetings with Bar Associ-
ation groups advocating the Code and attempting to mold it in a
politically acceptable fashion. I have explained to, and debated with,
lawyers, legislators, judges, and governors the merits and demerits of
the Code. Frankly, I was greatly demoralized when my most strenu-
ous and sincere efforts went for naught in 1975. At that time then-
Governor of Wyoming, Ed Hershler, vetoed a bill that had been
passed by overwhelming majorities in both the House and the Senate
of the State Legislature.
8
For those of us who have supported the 1990 UPC, what are the
prospects of its continued advancement? It was refreshing to see that
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("National Conference") showed a renewed interest in the 1990 UPC9
and that a full scale promotional campaign for its adoption will be
pursued."° The approval of the 1990 amendments to article II consti-
SJ. PENNINGTON STRAUS, History and Origin of the Uniform Probate Code, in ACLEA NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: STUDY MATERIALS 1, 14 (1972).
' See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 117-54 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., A Comparison of the Uniform Probate Code with the Law of
Texas-Trust Administration, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES (1976); Lawrence H.
Averill, Jr., An Introduction to the Administration of Decedents' Estates Under the Uniform
Probate Code, 20 S.D. L. REV. 265 (1975); Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming's Law of Dece-
dents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code (pts.
1-4), 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 169 (1972), 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 188 (1973), 9 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 567 (1974), 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 155 (1975).
8 First the Good News... and Then the Bad, 13 UPC NOTES (Joint Editorial Board for the
Uniform Probate Code, Chicago, Ill.), Sept. 1975, at 6, 11.
' See Elective Share Revisited, N.J. L.J., Dec. 27, 1990, at 8 (National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws approves extensive revision of article IT of UPC).
o See Letter from Richard V. Wellman, Executive Director, Joint Editorial Board for Uni-
form Probate Code, to Arkansas Uniform Law Commissioners (Feb. 14, 1992) (on file with the
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tute an important starting point for this effort. I sincerely hope that
interest in the 1990 UPC will be rejuvenated and the many states,
which have either completely ignored or only given lip service to the
total concept of the Code, will be re-exposed to its merits and accept
the total package. How the new sections in article II fare in legal
literature, such as the articles in this Symposium, may significantly
influence the success of the new 1990 UPC.
Although I have some criticisms of the 1990 UPC, I am not an op-
ponent. My complaints are like those of a sibling: they remain within
the family. I will defend the Code against outside carping. I sincerely
believe that the 1990 UPC is better than anything else available. In
addition, although some of my comments may seem insignificant to
some, I do not intend to nitpick the 1990 UPC. The original Code
received too much of that during the initial years when several com-
parative pieces were issued that were pure diatribes.11 The Code, as
initially promulgated, was quibbled to death. Too little credit was
given to it as a comprehensive, integrated package. As such a pack-
age, it was far better than any the critics were able build them-
selves.12 My observations are food for thought, and I hope they will
provide a basis for future improvement of the 1990 UPC and its
processes.
II. HISTORY OF THE 1990 UPC
A. Historical Overview'3
If a complete history of the UPC is to be written, it should be done
by Professor Richard V. Wellman. No one else has dedicated as many
years to this Code as he has, although others have certainly labored
Albany Law Review) (discussing the new JEB/UPC-ATEC efforts to encourage enactment of
the UPC); Letter from Richard V. Wellman, Executive Director, Joint Editorial Board for Uni-
form Probate Code, to Byron Eiseman, Jr. (Oct. 10, 1991) (on file with the Albany Law
Review).
H See REPORT BY THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE (1973); RICHARD V. WELLMAN, RESPONSE OF THE JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNI-
FORM PROBATE CODE TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA'S "THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALY-
SIS AND CRITIQUE" (1974); James N. Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate
Code, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413.
2 For example, after Governor Hershler of Wyoming vetoed the Code, a study committee
was formed to draft a new probate reform act that satisfied the opponents. It was ultimately
approved by the legislature and signed by the Governor. See WYo. STAT. §§ 2-1-101 to 2-15-107
(1980). For a criticism of this enactment see Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Wyoming Probate
Code of 1980: An Analysis and Critique, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 103 (1981).
" Substantial portions of the following history appear in two of the author's previous publi-
cations. See LAWRENCE H. AVERILL, JR., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1987);
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long and hard on the project.'4 Perhaps he will write that opus for
posterity before he leaves the project. This piece does not contend to
be a complete history of the UPC. Rather, it is a snap-shot of the
1990 UPC from a historical perspective. Some thought will be given
to where the 1990 UPC came from, the sources of its substance and'
language, and what needs to be done to gain greater future accept-
ance of the Code.
Necessarily, no attempt will be made to trace the history of all
areas of law dealt with by the 1990 UPC. Suffice it to say that many
of the American concepts in this area of law are traceable to the En-
glish law system. When states first enacted probate laws they re-
moved many of the archaic and undesirable elements of the English
laws. Paradoxically, much of English probate law today has been im-
proved and modernized in contrast to the current law of most of our
states. Many of the modern and improved rules and procedures pres-
ently existing under English law greatly influenced the draftsmen of
the UPC. 15
The perception of a substantial percentage of non-lawyers is that
the word "probate"'16 refers to a system reeking of unnecessary costs
and delays. The resultant cry has been "avoid probate.' 1 7 Several
successful commercial enterprises have been launched from this con-
ceptual pad and they accuse the legal profession of perpetuating and
perpetrating this undesirable situation."
Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship. and Trusts: A
Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code (part 1), 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 169 (1972).
14 One such person who deserves special recognition is the late Professor William F. Fratcher
of the University of Missouri School of Law. He was the original Research Director and had
direct involvement in drafting the UPC, particularly article V concerning guardianship and
conservatorship. Professor Fratcher wrote many articles about probate reform and the Code.
See, e.g., William F. Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administration Under the Uniform Pro-
bate Code, 110 TR. & EST. 5 (1971); William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legisla-
tion, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037 (1966); William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legis-
lation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 983 (1966).
" See WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, PROBATE CAN BE QUICK AND CHEAP: TRUSTS AND ESTATES IN
ENGLAND (1968) (a description of the English system of probate and suggestions as to how such
a system may improve American probate law).
16 The definition of the term "probate" is a "[c]ourt procedure by which a will is proved to
be valid or invalid; though in current usage this term has been expanded to generally refer to
the legal process wherein the estate of a decedent is administered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1202 (6th ed. 1990).
11 Professor Langbein contends that probate is, in fact, being avoided. See John H.
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L,
REv. 1108 (1984).
'a See MURRAY T. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 233-63 (1968) (chapter eleven is enti-
tled "Our Unknown Heirs" and is concerned with excessive attorney fees); NORMAN F. DACEY,
HOW TO AVOID PROBATE! (rev. ed. 1990). The Dacey book is still in print and claims it has sold
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The source of much of the present dissatisfaction is in the laws
themselves. First, there is no uniformity between the laws of most of
the fifty states. This fact may cause not only unjust results but also
an inherent confusion and distrust among a very mobile lay populace.
Second, many of the laws in this area are not contemporary; conse-
quently, they do not take into account the material changes that have
occurred in our society. Not only have we changed from a primarily
rural to prinmarily urban society, but also from one with a primary
emphasis directed to ownership of real estate to one directed toward
ownership of personal property and other contractual relationships.
Furthermore, our society continues to progress from one education-
ally and sociologically provincial to one nationally and even interna-
tionally cognizant. The continued increase in the number of persons
who have had multiple marriages and children with more than a
single spouse creates a social phenomenon that much current succes-
sion law does not adequately address:'19 Many of the present laws on
these matters, therefore, do not adequately deal with the primaiy
problems posed by the average person in the succession of wealth at
death or in the management of that person's property during
disability.
These deficiencies, are not only obvious today but were obvious to
some almost fifty years ago. In 1940, Professor Atkinson suggested to
the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law ("Probate Section") that this organization prepare a
Model Probate Code.26 This idea resulted in the publication of a
Model Probate Code and accompanying studies in 1946.2"
Although the Model Probate Code had a direct influence and effect
on legislative revisions in several states,22 it had neither the compre-
hensiveness nor the impetus to influence a majority of states to adopt
it. Therefore, in 1962, the Probate Section and the National Confer-
1.5 million copies. Id. Probate avoidance books continue to be popular. See, e.g., HENRY W.
ABTS III, THE LIVING TRUST (1989); Louis AUSTIN, THE LIVING TRUST ALTERNATIVE (1988);
ROBERT A. ESPERTI & RENNo L. PETERSON, LOVING TRUST (1991).
" This trend is one of the principal reasons for the substantial alteration of article II made
in the 1990 UPC. See UNIF. PROB. CODE ("U.P.C.") art. II, prefatory note (1991).
20 Thomas E. Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 183,
189 (1940); see also Thomas E. Atkinson, Old Principles and New Ideas Concerning Probate
Court Procedure, 23 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 137, 141 (1939) (recommending greater uniform-
ity in the probate procedural system).
2 See MODEL PROB. CODE ("M.P.C.") (1946), in LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS
IN PROBATE LAW (1946).
22 See R.G. Patton, Improvement of Probate Statutes-The Model Code, 39 IOWA L. REV.
446 nn.1-3 (1954) (noting various states that, at the time, followed the Model Probate Code in
drafting or considering new probate legislation).
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ence accepted a suggestion made by J. Pennington Straus of the Phil-
adelphia Bar to revise and consolidate the Model Probate Code 'and
other related and relevant uniform laws into a uniform probate law.
In response, each organization formed a separate'committee and the
late Professor William F. Fratcher of the University of Missouri
School of Law was appointed Research Director to conduct prelimi-
nary studies during 1963-1964. Thereafter a reporting staff was re-
cruited to draft the Uniform Probate Code under the supervision of
the two committees. Professor Richard V. Wellman, then of the Uni-
versity of Michigan and now of the University of Georgia, became the
reporting staff's Chief Reporter.
After six drafts, six years of extensive research, consultation, and
discussion, an official text was approved in August 1969, by the Na-
tional Conference and by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association. Although inspired and initiated as a project to re-
draft and update the Model Probate Code, the eventual finished
product turned out to be much more. It not only was more compre-
hensive in coverage but also exhibited greater innovation and imagi-
nation. In addition, many of its basic philosophies were different.
Consequently, the Code offered a more viable package for influencing
and affecting modern probate legislation.2"
23 Naturally, through the last twenty years the code has been the subject of a great deal of
legal commentary. A significant portion of it is cited throughout this Article. One of the most
important publications was the Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual published in 1972 and
edited by Professor Robert R. Wright. ASSOCIATION OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ADMINIS-
TRATORS, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL (Robert Wright ed., 1972). It contained a
series of articles by recognized authorities on all parts of the Code. Professor Wellmanas edi-
tor, updated and expanded this manual in a second edition published in 1977. ASSOCIATION OF
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL,
(Richard V. Wellman ed., 2d ed. 1977). Since that edition, the manual has not been updated.
Professor Wellman, of course, has also written numerous articles on the Code. See, e.g., Richard
V. Wellman, Lawyers and the Uniform Probate Code, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 548 (1973); Richard V.
Wellman, Law Teachers and The Uniform Probate Code, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 180 (1972); Rich-
ard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70s, 2 CONN. L. REV.
453 (1970); Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate
Avoidance, 44 IND. L. REV. 191 (1969).
One commentary technique that proved very beneficial to reform was the comparison article.
Numerous articles comparing the Code to local laws have been published over the years. See,
e.g., THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
(1973); Robert A. Diab, New Jersey and the Uniform Probate Code, 2 SETON HALL L. REV. 323
(1971); John W. Fisher IT & Scott A. Curnutte, Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and
Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61 (1990); Camilla K.
Haviland, Shall We Rebuild Our House of Probate? The Uniform Probate Code, 19 U. KAN. L.
REV. 575 (1971); John P. McKleroy, The Uniform Probate Code: A Comparison With Existing
• Alabama Probate Law, 2 CUMB.-SAMFORD L. REV, 1 (1971); James N. Zartman, supra note 11;
see also supra note 6 (citing comparative articles by Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.).
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In March of 1971 Idaho"' became the first state to adopt the Code
substantially in whole. Since that time, more than thirty percent of
the fifty states have enacted laws that substantially conform to the
Code or parts of it.2" Promotion and enactment of the Code have not
been easy in the states and have had varying degrees of success.26 Its
primary detractors include what would appear to be bonding compa-
nies, loosely organized groups of older bar members, and occasionally
newspaper publishers. In some situations, these opponents have
proved to be formidable adversaries and have shown considerable in-
fluence with state legislators and governors.
B. Maintenance Efforts
For the purpose of promulgating the UPC, a Joint Editorial Board
for the Uniform Probate Code ("Editorial Board") was established in
1970. Its membership now consists of three persons selected by the
National Conference, three members selected by the Probate Section,
three members of The American College of Trust and Estate Coun-
sel, one Liaison-American Association of Retired Persons, two Liai-
son-Law School Teachers, one Liaison-Probate Judge, the Execu-
tive Director, and the Director of Research.2 7 The Editorial Board's
responsibilities are: (a) to monitor literature dealing with the Code;
(b) to watch for problems that develop in the Code itself and that
arise in states which have enacted or are considering whether to en-
act it; (c) to educate the Bar and public about the Code; and (d) to
reevaluate, alter and edit the Code's text for the purpose of removing
imperfections and improving content, both substantially and editori-
ally.28 Professor Wellman was named as the its first Educational
Director.29
After the initial rush of enactments in the late sixties and early
seventies, the Code passed into a less turbulent, but also less produc-
tive, time from a legislative enactment standpoint. This is not to say
24 See IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to 15-7-401 (1972).
28 See U.P.C., 8 U.L.A. 1-4 (Supp. 1992). The Code was not offered to legislatures on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. States were encouraged to accept parts they liked and exclude parts they
did not. See Richard V. Wellman, A Reaction to the Chicago Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
536, 542.
26 For a discussion of some of the problems proponents faced during the first ten years, see
John H. Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a Model of Estate Settlement, 66 VA. L. REV.
727, 735 n.34 (1980).
27 See U.P.C. at vi (10th ed. West 1992).
28 See Joint Editorial Board, 1 UPC NOTES (Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate




that the Code was moribund or inert. Much work was being done and
meritorious alterations were constantly being made as Professor
Wellman continued to promote and advocate both the enactment of
the Code and its continual improvement.
One of the most important developments in the past several years
was the recruitment and appointment of Professor John Langbein to
the Editorial Board and Professor Lawrence Waggoner as Director of
Research. Both have worked to instill a new and vibrant interest in
studying and improving the Code. Their law review articles and other
writings have demonstrated the need for this constant review and re-
vision. 0 There is no doubt that the most recent draft of article II
clearly reveals their pervasive influence and draftsmanship. The com-
bination of Wellman as Executive Director and scholarly resources
such as Langbein and Waggoner provides the Editorial Board with
renewed inspiration. Considering the talents of these three, the 1990
Code is clearly on the move. Whether we are moving ahead, only the
success in state legislatures will tell. I am not convinced that we have
made it to the ultimate end and believe there is still a substantial
amount of work to be done.
With all of this supervision and support, the Code is continually
being updated and improved. During 1975-1976, the National Confer-
ence and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
approved significant amendments called the "1975 Technical Amend-
ments" promulgated by the Joint Editorial Board." Many of these
amendments included suggestions and improvements made by vari-
ous bar committees that had studied the Code for enactment in their
respective states. Other alterations were made in 1977, 1979, 1982,
1984, 1987, 1988, and 1989.32 In 1990 the National Conference again
approved a revision that substantially altered article II. This 1990
alteration was so significant as to justify calling it the Uniform Pro-
bate Code of 1990.
When the initial enthusiasm and national effort to enact the Uni-
form Probate Code as a comprehensive code lost much of its original
momentum, the commissioners altered their promotional approach
'o See, e.g., John H. Langbein,. The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Refor-
mation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U..PA.
L. REV. 521 (1982); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the -Wills Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1975); Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate
Code's System for Intestate Distribution Among Decedents, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 626 (1971).




regarding several new and old matters. In relevant and appropriately
separable areas of probate law, the commissioners developed free-
standing acts from similar provisions integrated into the Code. This
technique permits the provisions to become law as part of the whole
Uniform Probate Code or as a separable and possibly more palatable
distinct uniform act. Accordingly, the Uniform Probate Code now in-
corporates the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act 33 approved in
1979 and modifying part 5 of article V;34 the Uniform Guardianship
and Protective Proceedings Act35 approved in 1982 altering parts 1, 2,
3, and 4 of article V; 36 the Uniform International Wills Act approved
in 1977 and adding part 10 to article II;37 and the Uniform Succes-
sion Without Administration Act 8 approved in 1983 from sections
3-312 to 3-322, which had been added to article III of the Code in
1982.39
The trend to offer both integrated text and freestanding acts has
intensified during the last few years. The 1990 UPC contains several
examples. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act
40
was promulgated separately in 1986 and was incorporated as part 9 of
new article 11.41 The Uniform Nonprobate Transfers at Death Act,42
which includes the Uniform Multiple-Person Accounts Act 43 and the
Uniform TOD Security Registration Act,44 was promulgated in 1989
and mirrors article VI of the 1990 UPC. 4'5 New article II was sepa-
rately promulgated as the Uniform Intestacy, Wills, and Donative
Transfers Act in 1991.46 Finally, section 2-51117 of the 1990 UPC was
promulgated as the new Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts
13 See UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 1-10, 8A U.L.A. 278-86 (1983 & Supp.
1992).
See U.P.C. §§ 5-501 to -505 (1991).
3' See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT §§ 1-101 to 2-335, 8A U.L.A.
440-519 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
" See U.P.C. §§ 5-101, -201 to -212, -301 to -312, -401 to -431 (1991).
" See U.P.C. §§ 2-1001 to -1010 (1991).
38 Sei UNIF. SUCCESSION WITHOUT ADMIN. ACT §§ 101-404, 8A U.L.A. 404-19 (Supp. 1992).
" See U.P.C. § 3-312 to -322 (1991).
4o See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES WITH 1990 AMENDMENTS ACT §§ 1-9, 8A
U.L.A. 342-84 (Supp. 1992).
", See U.P.C. § 2-901 (1991) (statutory rule against perpetuities).
" See UNIF. NONPROBATE TRANSFERS ON DEATH ACT §§ 101-405, 8A U.L.A. 282-314 (Supp.
1992).
" See UNIF. MULTIPLE-PERSON ACCOUNTS ACT §§ 1-35, 8A U.L.A. 264-81 (Supp. 1992).
" See UNIF. TOD SEC. REGISTRATION ACT §§ 1-12, 8A U.L.A. 430-39 (Supp. 1992).
" See U.P.C. §§ 6-201 to -277, 6-301 to -310 (1991.
4" See UNIF. ACT ON INTESTACY, WILLS, AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 001-1106, 8A U.L.A. 144-
263 (Supp. 1992).
" See U.P.C. § 2-511 (1991) (testamentary additions to trusts).
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Act,48 and section 2-702 as the new Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act,49 both in 1991.
The existence of freestanding acts makes the Code a more dynamic
document. It permits those who advocate probate and related law re-
form to select the most politically palatable acts for passage in their
jurisdiction. This innovation should increase the influence of the
Code and motivate more jurisdictions to adopt its reform proposals.
C. Influence and Use of the Uniform Probate Code
The influence and the use of the Code is growing in a variety of
ways. The laws of nearly all if not all states have been affected by the
Code.50 The primary vehicles of influence are- as follows:
(1) The enactment of the UPC as a Code in full with some amend-
ments. Fifteen states (with year of enactment) fall into this ,category:
Alaska (1972), Arizona (1973), Colorado (1973), Florida (1974),
Hawaii (1976), Idaho (1971), Maine (1979), Michigan (1978),
Minnesota (1974), Montana (1974), Nebraska (1974), New Mexico
(1975), North Dakota (1973), South Carolina (1986), and Utah
(1975);5,
(2) Piece-meal enactment of segments or sections of the Code for
inclusion into another probate code or law. Nearly all the other states
have enacted some part or section of the Code.52 Sections of article II
have been particularly popular. For example, California incorporated
many provisions, in whole or in part, of the Code into its recent revi-
sion of its probate code;53
41 See UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUST ACT §§ 1-7, 8A U.L.A. 421-25 (Supp. 1992).
" See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT §§ 1-12, 8A U.L.A. 315-23 (Supp. 1992).
50 See Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting
States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599 (1985).
" U.P.C., 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1992). For articles comparing the Code to the various state en-
actments, see Richard V. Wellman & James W. Gordon, Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws:
How UPC Article II has Fared in Nine Enactments, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 357; Richard V.
Wellman & James W. Gordon, The Uniform Probate Code: Article III Analyzed in Relation to
Changes in the First Nine Enactments, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477.
2 Unfortunately, there is no source of data indicating what sections or parts of sections have
been passed in the various non-Code states.
11 See CAL. PROB. CODE (Deering 1991). In order to assure proper judicial construction of
these Code provisions, the new California law requires that any portion of the state's probate
code that is the same "in substance" as a provision of the UPC, must be "construed as to
effectuate the general purpose to make uniform the law in those states which enact" such provi-
sions of the UPC. Id. § 2(b).
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(3) Referred to as a model of modern policy by a court interpreting
its own non-Code provision; 54 and
(4) Referred to as secondary or persuasive authority for determin-
ing proper rules of construction for the common law. 5
Even if comprehensive enactment does not continue, the Code's in-
fluence over the law of probate and related matters, by any of the
above cited means, will continue to increase.
III. PROMOTION OF THE 1990 UPC
A. Endorsements
Whether the 1990 UPC will have a greater or lesser influence on
state legislation than the original enactment depends largely upon
the quality and scope of its promotion program. To the end of effec-
tive endorsement, several suggestions are in order.
Initially, proponents of the 1990 UPC should obtain the endorse-
ment of specific groups interested in the Code's enactment, namely
senior citizen and women's organizations. 6 The members of both
types of organizations have a direct interest in the 1990 UPC's enact-
ment. These groups are likely to be strong supporters of the 1990
UPC and must encourage their local organizations to promote legisla-
tive enactment of the Code. There is no doubt that the senior citizen
groups were important advocates of the original Code. Legislators
count votes. The more voters who seem. to be interested in the act,
the better. The fact that segments of the bar or bench are against the
1990 UPC may work in its favor.
Where possible, additional sponsorship of the 1990 UPC should be
solicited. The banking community was very helpful in the first major
UPC effort. Since the American Bankers Association ("Bankers As-
" See, e.g., First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Watson, 239 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 1970) (noting
that although Alabama's probate code did not contain all of the provisions of § 2-508 of the
UPC, both codes recognize revocation by divorce); In re Estate of Graef, 368 N.W.2d 633, 640
(Wis. 1985) ("The language of § 2-508 of the [UPC] as to the divorced spouse being treated as
having predeceased the testator sets forth the intention of the Wisconsin legislature.").
"B See, e.g., Russell v. Estate of Russell, 534 P.2d 261 (Kan. 1975) (adopting the substance of
M 2-508 of the UPC regarding revocation); Thompson v. Botts, 423 N.E.2d 90 (Ohio 1981) (Ohio
Supreme Court adopting the rationale of §§ 6-103(a) and 6-104(a) of the 1969 UPC); Smith v.
Smith, 519 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (utilizing § 2-508 of the 1969 UPC to interpret a
similar section of the Texas Probate Code).
56 The general comment to article II, part 2, states that the Assembly of the National Associ-
ation of Women Lawyers endorses the revised elective share. U.P.C. art. II, part 2 gen. cmt.
(1991). It would be very helpful if these organizations would actively promote the 1990 UPC
when it is introduced before the various state legislatures.
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soc.") endorsed the first Code, they were supportive of it when it
reached legislative consideration. The Bankers Assoc. needs to again
be sought out, and their advocacy solicited. With the recent scandals
in the financial community, 7 an effort supporting the 1990 UPC may
have meritorious public relations benefits to the banking community.
More than mere endorsement by the Bankers Assoc. is necessary. It
is hoped that persons who work in the banking community will prove
to be useful resources and advocates for the 1990 UPC. Bankers often
have significant contacts with state legislatures. The beliefs and
desires of the banking community are very influential regarding legis-
lation of this nature.
B. Empirical Studies
As part of the effort to gain endorsement, the Joint Editorial
Board should encourage and sponsor studies to gather empirical in-
formation concerning the operation of the 1990 UPC in states that
have substantial parts of the original code."8 In my numerous
presentations of the Code to a wide range of lay, legal and judicial
groups, a typical question asked is, "How well is the Code working
where enacted?" In response, opponents of the UPC typically pose
worst-case scenarios, claiming that the Code inadequately deals with
the legitimate concerns raised. It would be tremendously valuable to
be able to respond to such worst-case scenarios with the results of
respectable and thorough studies demonstrating the Code's efficiency
and ability to protect the legitimate concerns of interested persons.
C. Nonlegal Publications
The Joint Editorial Board is well advised to solicit nonlegal articles
concerning the UPC that can be published in popular magazines such
as Reader's Digest. As all estate planning teachers know, these publi-
cations tend to have more influence on the populace than all of the
See generally Eric Schurenburg, The S & L Black Hole: How It Will Suck You In,
MONEY, July 1990, at 68 (discussing the causes of the savings and loan crisis and the negative
effect it will have on the banking industry and consumers alike).
"' Additional studies similar to the one by Terry L. Crapo need to be conducted. See Terry
L. Crapo, The Uniform Probate Code-Does It Really Work?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 395. Al-
though the Crapo study was very positive, it concerned only one state (Idaho) after the Code
had been in operation for only three and one-half years. See id. The UPC has been functioning
for almost twenty years in several states. It is time to conduct another poll of lawyers, judges,




good advice and counsel of the practicing attorney. Rather than ex-
plain the 1990 UPC in detail, these articles should emphasize how
well the UPC is working in states that have enacted it.
D. Communication
Substantial effort should be made to increase communication be-
tween the Joint Editorial Board, law school faculty members teaching
in the area of trusts and estates, and faculty members who have ex-
pressed interest in the legislative progress, judicial interpretation,
and internal development and maintenance of the 1990 UPC. When
the Code was first promulgated in 1969, an academic liaison commit-
tee was formed. To my knowledge, this committee no longer exists.
Although there are Editorial Board members designated as law
school representatives, it appears that these persons have not com-
municated on a regular and organized basis with other faculty mem-
bers working in the area. 9 Consequently, I urge that the liaison com-
mittee be reinstituted, and a broad and significant agenda of
activities be imposed upon it.
Another aspect of pre-1990 UPC promotion that has disappeared is
the newsletter, UPC Notes. This multipage newsletter was published
twenty-four times between July 1972 and October 1979.0 It provided
the type of information previously mentioned regarding law school
liaisons. I recall this paper was very helpful in promoting the original
Code. Its demise, apparently for economic reasons, was unfortunate
and left those who are interested in the Code, but not on the Joint
Editorial Board, without a steady source of useful information about
the status and development of the UPC.
I submit that reinstitution of this newsletter would be extremely
helpful in promoting the 1990 UPC. Faculty members generally con-
stitute the primary advocates for Code enactment. Although the indi-
vidual commissioners of the National Conference in each state are
responsible for promoting uniform laws, I know from personal discus-
sions with commissioners that assistance from faculty in this en-
deavor is essential and productive. Faculty members must be kept
informed of Code matters. A newsletter would accomplish this. In
this vein, it is my hope the articles in this Symposium will be circu-
lated to all professors in the field of trusts and estates.
'" This is not meant as a criticism of such faculty members, but rather to identify a struc-
tural deficiency in the support organization.
60 See UPC NOTES (Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, Chicago, Ill.), July
1972 - Oct. 1979.
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E. Consultative Groups
Several years ago the American Law Institute ("ALI") created con-
sultative groups for its restatement projects. 1 These groups are com-
posed of members who express an interest in working on a particular
project. Membership is voluntary and nonselective. Members of the
groups receive copies of the working drafts and are invited, at their
own expense, to comment in writing or attend meetings where the
drafts are discussed. The principal advantage of the consultative
groups is that they provide those drafting the project with a sounding
.board of interested persons able to offer greater insight into the
issues raised by each draft.62 The apparent organizational theory be-
hind this system is based upon the principle that the more persons to
01 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Report of the Director, 64 A.L.I. PROC. 501 (1987). Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Director of the ALI, stated in regard to the Members Consultative Groups:
The arrangement [the Consultative Groups] responds to two concerns. First, many mem-
bers with strong interest in specific legal fields have been unable to participate as members
of the project Advisory Committees, owing simply to the limitations in the size of those
Committees. Second, the drafts produced in our projects have not been getting the benefit
of as many informed viewpoints as they might, particularly given the fact that floor discus-
sion at Annual Meetings usually is governed by severe time restraints.
Id. at 511.
2 The broad circulation of drafts to persons showing an interest in the project is symbiotic.
The drafters gain by seeing how other minds respond to language and concepts. This can have
an extraordinarily beneficial effect on the final product. The interested outsider benefits by
observing how the process works and seeing what matters were considered and rejected. This
aids the latter when making final product interpretations. One of the troubles with the current
drafting process is that those of us who are called upon to interpret the final product do not
have any knowledge of what the drafters considered, rejected, or modified. This makes for
strained and unfortunate reactions.
In their article in this symposium, Professors Halbach and Waggoner describe a situation
where greater dissemination of the materials might have been very beneficial to the Joint Edi-
torial Board in the final product and particularly in response to the final product. In explaining
the process the Board considered in redrawing § 2-603 of the Code dealing with antilapse, they
stated:
Admittedly, this question of the appropriate effect to be given to words of survivorship
is a difficult one. Yet it is one that needed to be answered. It is not unimportant that
many lawyers who draft wills appear to believe that the insertion of an express require-
ment of survivorship will prevent application of the statute. Indeed, the framers found the
issue most troublesome, struggling conscientiously with a variety of possibilities in several
meetings before settling on the present solution. It might have been workable, for exam-
ple, to provide a considerably more limited (but hardly trouble free) protection against
inadvertent omissions by extending the pretermitted heir statute to all descendants rather
than merely protecting children. Or words of survivorship might have been treated as pre-
sumptively sufficient to overcome the antilapse statute, or as sufficient to overcome the
statute except with respect to devises made to the surviving members of a class or group of
devisees when none of the described or named devisees had descendants at the time the
will was written. Following lengthy debate, however, including consideration of current
drafting practices, examination of various alternative solutions, and review of drafts of
1992] An Eclectic History
review a draft, the better the finished product will be. In addition, it
previews, for the reporters who draft the projects, potential contro-
versies that may arise when the projects are presented to the entire
body.
Although the structure of the National Conference and the Joint
Editorial Board may not permit an exact duplication of this tech-
nique, a modified version is possible. 3 Because participation is volun-
tary, consultative groups of professors and lawyers could be organized
in line with the 1990 UPC's organizational structure. For example,
since there are six substantive articles, at least six UPC consultative
groups could be formed. If subgroups are desirable, they too could be
formed. Additional expenses for such a system would be minimal.
The principal expenseswould include the printing and mailing of dis-
cussion drafts to group members, and possibly the holding of discus-
possible statutory provisions, the provision now set out in section 2-603(b)(3) was sup-
ported by a consensus of the membership of the Joint Editorial Board.
Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivorship and Anti-
lapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1091, 1113-14 (1992). For someone like myself who is not in
the Board circle, the ability to peruse the materials considered would be an invaluable aid to
understanding and interpretation of that very complex section of the Code. Greater dissemina-
tion of materials of this nature through consultive groups would improve the chances of the
draftsmen and the Board receiving a broader range of input and reactions, of more accurate
final product interpretations, and of fewer frivolous or incorrect criticisms.
" :Ordinarily, the review processes for Uniform Acts, which are considered by the National
Conference and the American Bar Association, House of Delegates, are thorough and content
exacting. Recently, however, these organizations have been faced with the task of completing
work on long agenda and the intensity of review has varied depending on the circumstances.
For example, the amendments to article II of the 1990 UPC were approved at the 1990 annual
meeting of National Conference without significant discussion or debate. Interview with John
Phillip Carroll, member of National Conference from Arkansas, in Little Rock, Arkansas (Sep-
tember 29, 1992). This lack of debate occurred possibly for a combination of factors: first there
had been pre-review by the Joint Editorial Board; second, the proposal was for modifications of
only one of the Articles, and third, several of the parts of the amendments were recently con-
firmed Uniform Laws. Despite the review by the Board, an additional review body such as a
Consultative Group could prove to be useful, particularly if the National Conference may pro-
vide only a cursory review of Code amendments. The proposal for the creation of similar con-
sultative groups for Code development is in no way meant to imply that the current drafters
have failed to seek suggestions of others or have ignored the concerns of others. To the con-
trary, the 1990 Code is replete .with ideas offered by others. Additionally, several years ago a
letter was sent to faculty soliciting submissions of their ideas and concerns about article II. I
am sure the Editorial Board considered seriously all responses. This random, shot in the dark,
communication approach, however, is not the equivalent of an organized communication sys-
tem. I suggest that an organization be created that encourages additional faculty and lawyers to
become directly involved in the drafting processes. Experience tells us that those interested in a
code project will take a more direct and focused interest in its success when they feel they are a
part of the official processes. Whether it is merely a perception or some other psychological
response, I am convinced that the initiation of such a program will benefit the Code and im-
prove its acceptance.
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sion sessions. In fact, as a cost cutting technique and point of conve-
nience, these sessions could be held at one or more relevant
meetings64 already being held by the Association of American Law
Schools, the American Bar Association, or the American College of
Trusts and Estates Counsel.
One of the most beneficial by-products of this approach would be
increased involvement in the UPC project. This, in turn, will make
those involved more avid advocates for legislative adoption of the
UPC. After all, legislative adoption is the name of the game for uni-
form laws.
IV. FORMAT ISSUES IN THE 1990 UPC
A. Uniform Act Drafting Style
On the surface, format concerns may seem petty and unimportant
to some. When a work is promoted as a "model," however, and its
acceptance is essential for success, format may be very important
both with regard to the work's understandability and substantive
clarity. Perhaps it is inevitable or unavoidable with a code the size of
the 1990 UPC, but when one studies it, a significant number of for-
mat inconsistencies and inadequacies are readily apparent. Although
the basic format of the 1990 UPC is consistent, numerous internal
format problems exist and new ones continue to appear. Correcting
these technical matters will make the 1990 UPC a more attractive
and marketable package.
First, the 1990 UPC lacks a clear and consistent format style. For
example, some sections seem to be quickly broken down into parts,
while others are kept together without outlining. There does not ap-
pear to be any reason for this inconsistency. If there are distinguisha-
ble differences between various sections, such differences are the
third degree of small. Compare, for example, section 2-109 dealing
with advancement65 with sections 2-40366 and 2-404.67 In the ad-
vancement section, each sentence is a separate paragraph. Further-
more, subparagraph (a) is broken into additional subparts, (i) and
(ii). Contrastingly, both sections 2-403, dealing with exempt property,
"' Most of these organizations have multiple meetings during the year. In addition, the
American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel has committee meetings during the annual
American Bar Association meeting.
U.P.C. § 2-109 (1991).
60 Id. § 2-403 (exempt property).
Id. § 2-404 (family allowance).
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and 2-404, dealing with the family allowance, are not divided into
two parts, notwithstanding the fact that their content has as much
variation among the sentences as the advancement section. Person-
ally, I prefer the approach taken in section 2-109 dealing with ad-
vancements. I find the outlined section easier to understand. Unfor-
tunately, this type of inconsistent structure detracts from the
argument that the 1990 UPC is a carefully crafted and integrated
whole. Such inconsistencies might give the impression that the Code
is merely a crazy-quilt of provisions from various jurisdictions and
drafters.
Admittedly, the substantive consequences of these criticisms are
not of any great magnitude. Some will think the issue unworthy of
comment. On the other hand, when a concept such as a uniform code
is marketed or advocated as a superior product, it should show its
superiority throughout, even as to details.
B. New Drafting Format
The 1990 UPC introduces a new drafting format without explana-
tion. I am referring to the titled or subtitled subparagraphs. Part 2 of
article II dealing with the elective share of the surviving spouse now
contains subheadings to subparagraphs. For example, section 2-201
dealing with the elective share now has emboldened subheadings for
the subparagraphs beginning with (a)."" This format also appears in
sections 2-706, 2-707, 2-709,"9 part 8 of article II,70 and sections 2-901
and 2-907, 7' but is not used in the other parts of article II, part 9.72
No explanation for the use of this technique is given, or why there
continues to be inconsistency in its use even among logical com-
parables. 73 All efforts should be taken to correct such inconsistencies.
In sum, I believe it is preferable that format be consistent through-
out the 1990 UPC. All sections should either have emboldened sub-
headings or the ones that now appear should be removed.
6' See id. § 2-201.
69 See id. §§ 2-706, -707, -709.
o See id. art. III, pt. 8 (general provisions concerning probate and nonprobate transfers).
71 See id. §§ 2-901, -907.
72 See id. art. II, pt. 9 (statutory rule against perpetuities; honorary trusts).
71 When I first noticed the inconsistencies, I thought perhaps the bolded subtitles were used
because the sections were also part of a freestanding uniform act. On further inspection, how-
ever, I found that this clearly is not the case. For example, part 10 of article II and article V are
also freestanding acts, but do not contain the bolded subparagraphs. I then speculated that it
was new style versus old. But this does not seem to be the answer. Article VI dealing with non-
probate transfer is a totally new article in the 1990 UPC, but does not contain emboldened
subparagraphs. Consequently, the inclusion of this new style may be accidental.
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C. Comments: Style and Content
A more significant set of format problems concern the great varia-
tion among the official comments to various sections. For those com-
ments that exist, they differ significantly in quality, style, length,
content, and scope. Inexplicably, some important sections do not
have a comment. This should not be the case. All sections, regardless
of length, should have a comment. Even the most obvious and clearly
stated section deserves some commentary. For example, there is
hardly a section in any code of this magnitude that does not contain
significant words requiring interpretation. Comments are essential
sources of critical interpretive information.
The 1990 UPC omits other important material."4 Take, for exam-
ple, section 2-108 dealing with afterborn heirs.75 Conceding that this
is a relatively simple and straightforward concept, a comment is jus-
tified if only to explain the reasons for the changes that were made
from the original Code to the 1990 version. Suddenly, we have ex-
panded the coverage of the section from "relatives" (undefined) to
"individuals. '76 This is not an insignificant alteration. Furthermore,
we now require this person in gestation to survive birth by 120
hours.77 No explanation is given why an afterborn may have to live
longer than an ordinary beneficiary. Regardless of whether the
changes are justified and meritorious, the absence of explanatory
materials in a comment is inexplicable.
Another section that, quite incredibly, has no accompanying com-
ment is section 2-512 codifying the events of independent signifi-
cance. 78 The section is full of words deserving comment. Additionally,
the section extends the doctrine regarding events of independent sig-
nificance beyond its normal common law interpretation by applying
it to wills of another being.79 This change is worthy of explanation
and illustration.
, One of the most irritating omissions in the comment portion of the 1990 Code is the unex-
plained absence of references to the old section numbers when the number has changed. It was
irritating enough to find some of the numbers had changed but exasperating to find no cross-
references. This problem is yet another reason to add "reporter's notes" to the Code. For a
discussion on the value of reporter's notes see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
75 U.P.C. § 2-108 (1991).
7" See id.
77 Id.
Id. § 2-512. It may be that the absence of a comment indicates a disagreement among the
draftsmen as to what should be said. Perhaps a stalemate of this nature could be resolved if the
suggestions made, supra, concerning the drafting processes were instituted. See supra notes 59-
64 and accompanying text.
" See U.P.C. § 2-512 (1991).
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Another shortcoming is that the existing comments are inconsis-
tent in length and content. Some are very helpful and truly guide the
reader, providing insight into the meaning and purpose of the sec-
tion. Many of the comments that are included in the 1990 UPC are
very good.80 An example is the comment to section 2-513 dealing with
the'separate writing disposing of tangible personal property.8 1 The
comment explains the purpose and scope of the revision and provides
an explanation of the clause itself"2 In addition, a planning example
is provided for draftsmen. This helps to ensure that the intent of
section 2-513 is carried out. The comment also discusses possible
problems that may arise in the application of the clause, and what
the consequences of those attempts will be.84 This is a truly useful
comment.
At the opposite extreme is the comment to section 2-510 dealing
with incorporation by reference.8 5 All we are told by the comment is
that the section codifies the common law and that the common law is
modified as to one particular element.8 " No example of the section's
use or intended purpose is provided. Considering that the incorpora-
tion by reference doctrine is a subject of continuing controversy
among the states, 7 the commentary should provide an explanation of
the doctrine's meaning and the reason(s) for its incorporation into
the 1990 UPC.
The comments to a uniform act are very important. The complete-
ness and helpfulness of comments are very important selling points
when promoting a uniform act to legislators. If the comments are
helpful, proponents and legislators who study the act have something
to relate to their concerns and answer their questions. Furthermore,
courts have found comments to be reflective of the legislative intent
10 See; e.g., id. §§ 2-106 (representation)" -109 (advancements), -513 (separate writing on tan-
gible property), -603 (antilapse).
SI Id. § 2-513 cmt.
82 See id.
83 Id. The comment provides:
Section 2-513 might be utilized by a clause in-the decedent's will such as the following:
I might leave a written statement or list disposing of items of tangible personal
property. If I do and if my written statement or list is found and is identified as
such by my Personal Representative, no later than 30 days after the probate of
this will, than my written statement or list is to be given effect to the extent au-
thorized by law and is to take precedence over any contrary devise or devises of
the same item or items of property in this will.
U.P.C. § 2-513 cmt. (1991).
84 See id.
88 Id. § 2-510 cmt.
88 See id.
87 See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 80, at 385-86 (2d ed. 1953).
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of the enacting state.8 8 It would be useful for the drafters of the 1990
UPC to work on improving existing comments, as well as including
comments for sections that do not have them.
D. Reporter's Notes
As a reviewer of the work of the Uniform Commissioners, a mem-
ber of the ALI, and participant in the preparation of the restate-
ments, I am struck by the lack of coordination and cooperation be-
tween these two prestigious law reform groups. The debate during
the May 1987 session of the ALI over the preferable meaning of rep-
resentation 9 showed a clear division between those who work on uni-
form laws and those who work on the restatements. Clearly, this con-
flict is less likely to occur now that Professors Langbein and
Waggoner are directly involved with both the Uniform Probate Code
and the Restatement of Property.
I mention the ALI for two particular reasons. First, the technique
and style of producing the restatements has some attributes deserv-
ing consideration. With the restatements, the commentary process
has developed to a much greater extent than with uniform laws. The
comments used with uniform laws are often extremely cursory and
give short shrift to the issues involved. 'With a restatement, however,
the comments elaborate the meaning and scope of the black letter
law in great detail. These additional comments are extremely useful
to users of the resource. I urge the commissioners, particularly those
on the Joint Editorial Board, to consider adopting a style and ap-
proach to the comments similar to the ALI approach.
In addition, the reporter's notes accompanying each section of a
restatement at the end of the comments are particularly beneficial to
scholars and advocates.90 These notes constitute the scholarship upon
which the black letter and its accoutermental comments are based.
Something of this nature should be produced for the uniform laws.
As with the comments, I believe all proponents would find it ex-
tremely helpful to be able to delve into the underlying bases for the
section presented by the commissioner. This type of resource would
88 See, e.g., Thompkins State Bank v. Niles, 537 N.E.2d 274, 283 (Ill. 1989). This point was
stressed by professors Halbach and Waggoner in their article in this Symposium discussing the
comment to § 2-603. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 62, at 1103.
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 28.2 (Tentative Draft No. 10,
1987).




not only help advocates of the 1990 UPC, but also those who inter-
pret it.
In many respects, uniform laws and the restatements are used sim-
ilarly. Although the uniform laws, when enacted, become binding law
on the courts, they often require interpretation. Resource notes, like
comments, are helpful in developing those interpretations. On the
other hand, the uniform acts and the restatements become authority
(albeit persuasive) even where not officially enacted. Clearly, the 1990
UPC has been referred to as the model of interpretation for ambigu-
ous statutes or where statutes do not exist.9 Consequently, the more
comprehensive the information concerning the sections is, the more
likely the interpretation will conform to desired results.
I believe that the Joint Editorial Board should produce a separate
volume of reporter's notes related to each of the sections of the 1990
UPC. It may be a monumental task, one that cannot be done in short
order, but if accomplished in a reasonable period of time it would
prove worthwhile and greatly benefit the law. Such notes would in-
crease'the likelihood of the 1990 UPC becoming law in many
jurisdictions.
V. TRACKING POLICIES IN THE 1990 UPC
A. Introduction
Tracking policies in probate laws, even the 1990 UPC, may be sim-
ilar to tracking court decisions concerning rules of will construction. 2
It may be difficult to distinguish between what is a pervasive objec-
tive policy and a mere subjective result.93 Even among ascertainable
and accepted policies there are overlaps, conflicts, and inconsisten-
cies. Furthermore, because the 1990 UPC is so comprehensive, 4 it is
impossible to address all areas in the space of this Article. Conse-
quently, I will be selective.
" See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
92 With the 1990 UPC, we are dealing with proposed legislation. Once enacted, court inter-
pretations will virtually always focus on findings of legislative intent. Legislatures, although
mindful of the need to address the underlying purposes and policies of the law, are not always
proficient at this task. Accordingly, the result may be a poorly designed and conceived legisla-
tive product.
" See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497,
542 (1977).
'" The 1990 UPC does not list comprehensively in a single place all of the policies and goals
it embodies. It is probably impossible to do so. Recognizing the likelihood of omission, conflict,
and ambiguity, the following provides, in non-hierarchial order, a representative list of the poli-
cies and goals in the 1990 UPC:
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I want to discuss two generally accepted policies espoused by the
1990 UPC. First, that succession law should 'reflect the desires of the
"typical person," both with regard to protecting expressions of desire
and anticipating situations where those expressions are inadequately
presented.9 5 The latter situation, of course, involves primarily intes-
tacy and inadequately drafted writings. In such scenarios the legisla-
ture, by way of statutory enactment, determines an estate plan by
(a) To make testamentary dispositions as simple and convenient as other transfer devices
such as joint tenancies, inter vivos trusts, employee benefit plans, and insurance policies. James
N. Zartman, Uniform Probate Code-Policies and Prospects, 61 ILL. B.J. 428, 429 (1973).
(b) The probate administration system should be as simple, cheap, and efficient as possible.
Id.
(c) The probate court should not be a regulatory agency but rather a court ready to dispose
of litigable problems. Id.
(d) Noiice requirements should be kept to a minimum unless controversies arise. Id. at 429-
30.
(e) Theprobate of uncontested wills and the administration of uncontested estates should be
administrative acts, not judicial controversies. Id. at 430.
(f) The relevant fiduciary, including the personal representative and the conservator, needs
as much authority as is necessary to accomplish the tasks without court involvement. Id.
(g) Bonding for fiduciaries should not be required for estate administration unless requested
by the testator or other interested persons. Id.
(h) Personal. representatives should be able to settle claims and make distributions without
court involvement unless an actual controversy arises. Id.
(i) The estate inventory should be a private matter between successors. Id.
(j) The intestacy laws should reflect the desires of a typical decedent. Id.
(k) Probate laws should be uniform. Id.
(l) Multistate estates should be settled efficiently with the domiciliary jurisdiction having
primary control. Id.
(m) Rules of construction and interpretation as well as evidentiary presumptions should fol-
low good estate planning technique.
(n) Formalities should be kept to a minimum except where they assist good estate planning.
(o) Wherever possible, probate law ad procedure should apply to the intestate estate as well
as the testate estate.
(p) Wherever possible, probate law and procedure should facilitate estate planning.
(q) Interested persons.should be given as much control and flexibility over the settlement
and management function as possible.
(r) Strong, effective remedies should be provided to discourage, prevent, and remedy avari-
cious, dishonest conduct.
(s) Parens patriae interference with freedom of property disposition should apply only where
necessary to protect significant interests, integrate lifetime and death-time transfers, and estab-
lish identifiable parameters for planning and predictability.
Several excellent articles have tried to articulate relevant policies that a probate law should
exhibit. See, e.g., William F. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1037 (1966); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); John H. Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a
Model of Estate Settlement, 66 VA. L. REV. 727 (1980).
.. " The predecessor to the UPC explicitly adopted this policy. See M.P.C. § 22 cmt., in SIMEs
& BASVE, supra note 21, at 62. It was noted that this desire "is a highly speculative matter." Id.
1992] An Eclectic History
operation of law. 6 This legislative estate plan fills in where the dece-
dent has failed to adequately provide for the transfer of assets upon
death. Because we lack the appropriate information, we seek to find
objective intent in such cases. The legislature substitutes its own per-
ception of the desires and expectations of the average person for'the
unexpressed subjective intent of the decedent. Therefore, what the
average person would do if that person had properly presented their
intent in an estate plan is a major criterion in determining various
probate questions.9 7
We are also concerned with matters of predictability, provability,
and correctness in result. These concerns are often represented most
clearly by statutes of wills and other formality requirements. As out-
lined in the seminal article by Gulliver and Tilson, formalities pro-
tect three basic functions: the ritual, evidentiary, and protective
functions.9 8 Professor Fuller added the concept of the channelling
function."9 Professor Langbein refines the functions to five: eviden-
tiary, channelling, cautionary, protective, and level of formality.100
96 Intent serving is not always the paramount policy applicable to succession issues. For ex-
ample, concepts of parens patriae come into play when interested persons need protection al-
though they feel they do not, or when other persons need protection from unreasonable acts of
the decedent. The former is represented clearly by the administration procedure requirements
that attempt to reduce the possibility of fraud and avarice.
" See Mary L. Fellows, In Search o? Donative Intent, 73 IowA L. REV. 611 (1988). Professor
Fellows states:
Imputing individualized and generalized intent by reference to competent estate planning
gives property owners the benefit of what may be called "equal planning under the law."
This concept establishes a standard by which a state may identify the need to reform a
donative instrument that resulted from inadequate legal advice and a basis for designing a
remedy to correct the error. The standard is especially appealing because it extends the
benefits of competent legal advice and drafting to all property owners, even if they did not
have access to adequate counsel when they executed their donative instruments.
Id. at 613.
We should be very careful, however, not to assume too quickly that the testator did not get
good estate planning merely because the instrument does not conform to the "good estate plan-
ning" model. For example, we should not assume that testators prefer any family member over
nonfamily. Testators often, I believe, say what they mean although some relatives may take
offense. One of the inherent features of a will is that its consequences occur after a person's
death and therefore the testator does not hear the carping of unhappy relatives.
" Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L.J. 1, 5-10 (1941).
"' Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). Fuller states
that "[iun this aspect form offers a legal framework into which the party may fit his actions, or,
to change the figure, it offers channels for the legally effective expression of intention." Id.
Accordingly, formalities can have two beneficial effects. First, they can assure that properly
expressed intent will be carried out and, second, discourage or prevent frivolous contentions
and law suits contrary to clearly and formally expressed intent.
oo John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REV 489, 492-
98 (1975).
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Notwithstanding how the issue is dissected, the primary concern is
the manner in which formality accommodates legitimate concerns
against over-formalistic interpretation. In other words, we do not
want formality to destroy what it is designed to protect.10 1 A person
who obeys the formalities has legitimate expectations that certain
legal effects will result.102
I mention these policies not to address them in detail.103 That
would be far beyond the scope of this piece. I mention them as a
preface to a discussion of whether the 1990 UPC, and in particular
... Professor-Langbein states:
The essential rationale of these rules is that when the purposes of the formal requirements
are proved to have been served, literal compliance with the formalities themselves is no
longer necessary. The courts have boasted that they do not permit formal safeguards to be
turned into instruments of injustice in cases where the purposes of the formalities are
independently satisfied.
Id. at 498-99 (citations omitted).
102 Professor Fuller warns of the extreme ends of the formality debate.
If language sometimes loses valuable distinctions by being too tolerant, the law has lost
valuable institutions, like the seal, by being too liberal in interpreting them. On the other
hand, in law, as in language, forms have at times been allowed to crystallize to the point
where needed innovation has been impeded.
Fuller, supra note 99, at 803.
'03 The proper place and scope of formalities in executing wills has become a cause celebre in
recent legal literature. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 100, at 489 (proposing a substantial com-
pliance doctrine for wills); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills,
68 N.C.L. REV. 541 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren, Attestation Requirement] (abolish the attesta-
tion by witnesses requirement); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009
(1992) [hereinafter Lindgren, Formalism] (proof of testamentary intent is the key, not proce-
dural techniques or physical attributes); Lydia A. Clougherty, Comment, An Analysis of the
National Advisory Committee on Uniform State Laws' Recommendation to Modify the Wills
Act Formalities, 10 PROB. L.J. 283 (1991) (opposed to the "substantial compliance" doctrine).
Cf. Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony-History, Significance, and Strategies, 29
S. TEX. L.J. 413 (1987) (detailing the critical importance of the will execution ceremony and
setting forth proper will execution technique). There is legitimate concern that when wills exe-
cution statutes mandate only "bare-bones" requirements, the legitimacy of some of the retained
requirements is subject to question. For example, if the testator does not have to sign in the
presence of witnesses, and the witnesses do not have to sign in the presence of the testator, the
continued attestation of witnesses is hardly justifiable. Cf. JOHN RITCHIE ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 253 n.18 (7th ed. 1988). What might make the
witnessing requirement worthy of retention is the ritual function of formalities and its psycho-
logical benefits. See Beyer, supra. The effort to eliminate rejection of wills because of technical
formality errors has reached England and New Zealand. See R.T. Oerton, Dispensing With the
Formalities, 141 NEW L.J. 1416 (1991); Rosemary Tobin, The Wills Act Formalities: A Need
for Reform, 1991 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 191. The issue has also been rekindled in Queensland,
Australia, one of the first jurisdictions to enact the "substantial compliance" concept to wills
validation. See John K. de Groot, Will Execution Formalities-What Constitutes Substantial
Compliance?, 20 QUEENSLAND L. Soc'y J. 93 (1990).
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the new article II,104 apply these policies consistently. Although they
have generally been followed, there are several provisions in the 1990
UPC that warrant review in light of the policies mentioned above.
B. Tracking Intent-Serving Policies
Although the 1990 UPC strives for consistency when administering
the intent-serving policy, it does not always demonstrate accurately
what the intent-serving result should be. If the desires of the typical
person under similar circumstance is the test, I am unsure that such
a test is backed by sufficient empirical information. I recommend
that additional studies be conducted on certain succession subjects.
The Code may indeed be correct in its analysis, but I am not con-
vinced that we have the necessary data to lend support.
Consider, for example, the 1990 UPC's reversal of the common law
presumption concerning advancements.10 5 This provision is similar to
the advancement provision in the original Act.106 In brief, the new
section requires a writing by the donor or donee evidencing that an
advancement or a gift in the nature of an advancement was in-
tended.107 If there is no writing, the section establishes an irrebut-
table presumption that no advancement was intended.10 8 The com-
ment's justification for reversing the common law presumption is an
unsubstantiated statement that most people consider and treat these
transactions as outright gifts.109 What is the source of this statement?
104 The Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code states that one of the themes to pro-
bate law sounded in the last twenty years is "the decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving
policies." U.P.C. art. II, prefatory note (1991).
10I See id. § 2-109. A similar formality is required for gifts in satisfaction of devises under
wills. See id. § 2-609 (Ademption by Satisfaction). The writing requirement for gifts in satisfac-
tion is not as objectionable. The will to which the gift is said to relate must follow a formality.
It is not illogical or unreasonable to require a reasonable formality in order to recognize changes
to the will. The mere unadorned writing required' by § 2-609 is not excessive. Advancements, of
course, deal with intestacy where there is no writing or the writing is inadequate. A large gift to
an heir is ambiguous at least, and may require extrinsic evidence for explanatory purposes.
Another provision deserving of similar analysis is § 2-514 dealing with contracts concerning
succession. U.P.C. § 2-514 (1991). Again, the new Code sets out a writing formality for contracts
to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate. Id.
100 For the original provision, see U.P.C. § 2-110 (1969).
107 Id. § 2-109 (1991).
108 Id. I am concerned here with the relevance of the intent of the typical decedent. For a
discussion of the formality requirements of the 1990 UPC see infra notes 117-54 and accompa-
nying text.
1o.See U.P.C. § 2-109 cmt. (1991). The comment states:
Most inter-vivos transfers today are intended to be absolute gifts or are carefully inte-
grated into a total estate plan. If the donor intends that any transfer during the donor's
lifetime be deducted from the donee's share of his estate, the donor may either execute a
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Is it based upon an empirical study? Are we sure this intent applies
to all gifts between persons? Would it not be reasonable to assume
that a person might have a different intent as to large gifts?" ° I am
not sure one can take "judicial notice" of the 1990 UPC's
justification."'
I find it unlikely that most persons would consider large gifts of
$10,000 or more to have no strings attached. Most people desire
equality among equals. The extra windfall of large gifts during a life-
time to one and not to others is not consistent with the general intent
of most people. In a perfect society people would not make large gifts
without advice of counsel, but we know this is not a perfect world.
The intent-serving sections in which I have the most confidence are
those where some attempt has been made to identify what the typical
person would want under normal circumstances. An example of this
is the new official definition of "representation" as employed in sec-
tion 2-106.1" Interestingly, the new approach, referred to as "per
capita at each generation," changes completely the approach taken in
most jurisdictions, including the approach adopted in the original
will so providing or, if he or she intends to die intestate, charge the gift as an advance by
writing within the present section.
Id.
. "' We might look to tax law for an example. The federal gift tax law says that gifts of
$10,000 or less per year, per person, are exempt from gift and estate tax consequences. I.R.C.
§ 2503 (West Supp. 1992). The allegorical explanation for the exclusion was to prevent donors
and donees from finding Uncle Sam under the Christmas tree. Similar to a no advancement
rule, gifts of that nature have no subsequent consequences. The reverse is true of gifts above
$10,000. Such gifts have gift and estate tax consequences. It might have been appropriate for
the draftspersons of the 1990 UPC to consider this $10,000 threshold in reversing the common
law presumption of advancement. It would have been logical to provide that gifts below $10,000
per donee, per year, are not considered advancements unless the particular formality is satis-
fied. Gifts above $10,000 might carry a presumption of, or against, advancement, with the quali-
fication that relevant extrinsic information, including declarations by the decedent, would be
admissible to determine intent.
The 1990 UPC even adopts the exclusion concept in its augmented estate provisions designed
to protect a surviving spouse. Gifts made within two years of death become part of the aug-
mented estate "to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the
years exceed $10,000.00." U.P.C. § 2-202(b)(2)(iv)(D) (1991). Accordingly, it would not be incon-
sistent or unfamiliar to apply the $10,000 threshold to advancements.
"' The 1990 UPC formality requirement for advancements is not without its supporters. See,
e.g., Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters,
55 AL. L. REV. 927 (1992).
11 U.P.C. § 2-106 (1991). The general comment to part 1 of article II states:
A system of representation called per capita at each generation is adopted as a means of
more faithfully carrying out the underlying premise of the pre-1990 UPC system of repre-
sentation. Under the per-capita-at-each-generation system, all grandchildren (whose par-
ent has predeceased the intestate) receive equal shares.
Id. art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt.; see also id. § 2-106 cmt. ("Recent survey ... suggests that the per-
capita-at-each-generation system of representation is preferred by most clients.").
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Code.113 The previous debate over representation rules concerned
whether the court should adopt a pure per stirpes definition or a per
capita with representation interpretation. Both statutes and court
decisions varied on this issue. Then a relatively unique approach to
intestate succession was proposed."' Normally, I would have viewed
this development with great skepticism. Having taught for many
years, however, and having pursued this matter with class after class,
I am convinced that the new provision accurately reflects the repre-
sentation approach most people would want if they understand the
options and have a choice. As indicated in the comment to section
2-106, survey results showed overwhelming support for the new
technique. 1 5
I like this technique for law reform. Find an educated and in-
formed audience and ask them what they would prefer in a specified
situation. Law students may provide such an. audience. Law students
have an understanding of the legal concepts involved. Furthermore,
they represent a wide range of societal backgrounds and, thus, pro-
vide an equally wide range of experiences upon which to base their
opinions. If academics poll their classes regularly, and discover that
the current Code approaches do not conform to the general desires of
Compare U.P.C. § 2-106 (1991) (per capita at each generation) with U.P.C. § 2-106 (1969)
(per capita with representation).
..4 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's Sys-
tem for Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 626 (1971); see also
Frederick B. McCall, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act: Its History and Philoso-
phy, 39 N.C. L. REV. 1, 53-56 (1960) (discussing North Carolina's intestate succession laws as of
1960 and describing how per capita at each generation functions); *Frederick- McCall & Allen
Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for North Carolina, 11 N.C. L. REV. 266, 292
(1933) (proposing a new intestacy act for North Carolina espousing a per capita system of dis-
tribution as to real and personal, property for persons of equal degrees of kinship); Norman A.
Wiggins, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act: Distributive Provisions, 39 N.C. L.
REV. 42, 53-56 (1960) (discussing the differences between North Carolina's old system of per
stirpes distribution as to real property and its new system espousing per capita distribution as
to both real and personal property). The current North Carolina statute continues to recognize
the per capita at each generation approach. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-15 'to -16 (1991); see also
Rawls v. Rideout, 328 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (referring to the North Carolina statu-
tory representation system as per capita at each generation). In 1981, Maine adopted per capita
at each generation as its system of representation in intestacy. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§
2-103, -104 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). California permits wills, trusts and other instruments to
use per capita at each generation as their distribution system by referring to § 247 of the Pro-
bate Code. CAL. PROB. CODE § 247 (Deering 1991).
116 Raymond H. Young, Meaning of "Issue" and "Descendants," 13 PROB. NOTES 225-27
(1988). A questionnaire was distributed to Fellows of the American College of Probate Counsel.
(Now called the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel). Id. at 225. The results were
surprising to some: they overwhelmingly preferred the per capita at each generation approach
over both per stirpes and per capita with representation. Id.
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law students, the matter may be worthy of further study and addi-
tional surveys. 116
VI. TRACKING FORMALISM.
Although the concept of formalism is thoroughly discussed in rela-
tion to several particular provisions of the 1990 UPC, 117 it is not dis-
cussed in every section where a formality, or the equivalent of a for-
mality, is required. My concern here is that the merits and demerits
of formalism arise any time a special requirement is set, not other-
wise required, in order to determine or carry out a decedent's in-
tent. ' This not only includes the formality necessary to execute a
will, but also any formality that is required of other dispositive doc-
trines such as advancement,"' satisfaction, 20 disposition of certain
types of tangible personal property,' 2' and succession contracts.
122
More subtle formalities include special evidentiary standards such as
a clear and convincing evidence standard'2 " and rebuttable presump-
" Based upon my informal polls of classes over the years, the Code generally accords with
student opinion. My students, however, have consistently disagreed with the Code's intestacy
rule regarding escheat. Large majorities are of the opinion that any blood relative, laughing
heirs and all, should take before the state. I believe most persons would agree with that opin-
ion. If the escheat rule was applied often, I would urge that the rule be reconsidered. Because it
affects so few estates, however, it does little damage to the policy of intent-finding and has
virtually no estate planning consequences.
I" See, e.g., U.P.C. §§ 2-502 cmt., 2-503 cmt., 2-507 cmt., 2-509 cmt., 2-511 cmt., 2-513 cmt.,
2-514 cmt., 2-603 cmt. (1991).
.. The problem of "formalities" may arise in unexpected places. Excessive complexity in a
statute may, in effect, constitute a formality. Take for example the spousal protection statute.
See id. §§ 2-201 to -207. Under the 1990 UPC this statute involves very complex concepts and
elaborate procedures that require a significant degree of knowledge to understand and use. The
antilapse provision in the 1990 UPC is another section with similar attributes. See id. § 2-603.
While complexity may be necessary to provide "clear and appropriate" results in complicated
factual situations, see Halbach & Waggoner supra note 62, at 1124 and these sections may have
beneficial results, their increased operational complexity may create expectation problems. If
one does not follow the letter of the Code in certain instances, undesirable consequences may
result. Instrument drafters are at risk. If they do not comply with the technical requirements of
very complex sections, testamentary intent may be denied or a successor's needs and desires
lost. Furthermore, from these adverse consequences may come the ugly prospect of professional
malpractice. Drafters must be made aware of these circumstances. "Safe harbor" techniques
need to be identified and illustrated.
See U.P.C. § 2-109 (1991).
"o See id. § 2-609.
"' See id. § 2-513.
"' See id. § 2-514.
.. See id. §§ 2-104 (right of survivorship conditioned upon showing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the person who would otherwise be an heir survived the decedent by 120 hours),
2-503 (clear and convincing evidence required to prove that a certain writing was intended to
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tions.124 Whenever formalities arise, they should be scrutinized as
closely as will execution procedures have been.
As a general rule, formalities should be reduced to their least re-
strictive format. 125 A balance must be reached that weighs the need
for reasonable evidentiary reliability against the costs of proof of in-
tent and denial of expectations. 126 The draftsmen have not been con-
sistent with this approach. A section that raises significant questions
as to formality is the advancement section, 127 which was discussed
previously regarding the intent-serving policy.' If the "writing" re-
quirement is not satisfied, this formality denies donor expectations
even in the clearest case of advancement intent because extrinsic evi-
dence of intent is inadmissible. 2  The formality, therefore, denies the
intent rather than carries it out. Ironically, under the 1990 UPC, the
formality required for an advancement is now almost equal to the
formality required for a statutory will. 30 Several commentators feel
that the draftsman, sub silentio, repealed and reversed the common
law conceptl of advancement without full justification."' This criti-
cism is justified in light of the fact that less restrictive approaches
could have been adopted while still working to prevent the litigation
evils caused by the common law presumption.
Another provision warranting the same level of scrutiny is the new
antilapse section.1 32 Realizing this section will have its own separate
discussion in this symposium, 33 I will not go into detail. My concern
in this area centers solely upon the inclusion of a new formality re-
be a will), 2-702 (expanding the 120 hour survivorship requirement and evidentiary burdens of
§ 2-104 to all donative dispositions).
124 See, e.g., id. § 2-603 cmt. ("[T]he rule of Section 2-603 yields to a finding of contrary
intention.").
"25 Professor Lindgren suggests applying the concept of parsimony to will formalities. See
Lindgren, Attestation Requirement, supra note 103; at 545-46. He states: "Here [in the juris-
prudence of succession] parsimony means that states should impose the least restrictive .re-
quirements that serve the purposes of formalities without seriously undercutting the policy of
free testation. The law should set requirements at a level that tends to enforce the testator's
intent, not frustrate it." Id. at 546 (citations omitted). It is an idea that has meritorious appli-
cation to all formalities.
'" Cf. Lindgren, Formalism, supra note 103, at 1016 (formalities are often unnecessary and
create obstacles to carrying out testamentary intent).
'g2 U.P.C. § 2-109 (1991).
128 See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
1" See U.P.C. § 2-109 (1991).
130 Compare id. § 2-109 with § 2-503 (both requiring a writing and showing of intent).
133 See, e.g., Mary L. Fellows, Concealing Legislative Reform in the Common-Law Tradition:
The Advancements Doctrine and the Uniform Probate Code, 37 VAND. L. REv. 671, 672 (1984);
Fried, supra note 111, at 937-38.
132 U.P.C. § 2-603 (1991).
133 See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 62.
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garding rebuttal of the antilapse provision.'" The antilapse provision
of section 2-603 presumes that a mere statement of survivorship such
as "if he survives me" or "my surviving children" is not "in the ab-
sence of additional evidence" a sufficient indication of an intent to
override the provisions's presumption.135 In addition, section 2-603
reverses the presumption concerning the antilapse provision's appli-
cation to the exercise of powers of appointment.136
One problem is the scope of the new antilapse statute. The 1990
UPC's antilapse statute applies to all devisees who fall within the
classification of being a grandparent or a descendant of a grandpar-
... The antilapse problem is a battle of presumptions that occurs when the testator has not
adequately anticipated the possibility that a devisee may predecease the testator. See generally
ATKINSON, supra note 87, § 140 (discussing the problem and effects of lapse and methods to
avoid such). In the absence of a statute, the common law presumed that the devise lapsed.
Although a testator can indicate in a will an intent to prevent lapse, most courts have refused
to admit extrinsic evidence to show intent. See RITCHIE ET AL., supra note 103, at 976. Gener-
ally, if an antilapse statute exists, it is presumed that the lapse does not apply when the devisee
has left one or more representatives. Id. at 977. State statutes vary greatly as to who, when,
where, and how they apply. Some statutes apply the presumption strongly in that the presump-
tion is rebuttable only if contrary intent is expressed on the face of the will. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-26-104 (Michie 1987). Others allow extrinsic evidence to be admitted to rebut
the presumption. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burke, 222 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1966). All the antilapse
statutes are intended to be "intent enforcing." It is a matter of opinion, and much has been
written on whether they have achieved that purpose. See Robert L. Fletcher, A Critical Note
on Lapse, 8 GONZ. L.' REV. 26 (1972); Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt Instru-
ments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1985); Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Stat-
utes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 EMORY L.J. 323 (1988).
135 U.P.C. § 2-603(b)(3) (1991). The statutory text uses the phrase "words of survivorship"
and the comment uses the phrase "mere words of survivorship." Compare U.P.C. § 2-603(b)(3)
(1991) with U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991). It is clear that if the testator adequately expresses an
intent to require survivorship, this expression will be given effect. U.P.C. §§ 2-601, 2-603 cmt.
(1991). The comment to § 2-603 states that "foolproof' drafting techniques of expressing a
contrary intent include adding an additional phrase to a devise that states "and not to [the
devisee's] descendants" or a separate clause that states "all lapsed or failed nonresiduary de-
vises are to pass under the residuary Clause," or an addition to the residuary clause that states
"including all lapsed or failed devises." U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991). Where or how the line is to
be drawn between "mere words of survivorship" and "express contrary intent" is not explained.
It is not unreasonable to speculate that litigation may develop over where and how that line is
to be drawn, notwithstanding the draftsmen's inclusion of the presumption to avoid litigation
and case by case adjudication. For example, how will courts interpret a devise that state "to my
surviving brothers and sisters, alone," or an additional phrase in the will that states: "all others
not named as devisees in this will are excluded from taking under this will"?
"' See id. § 2-603(a)(3)-(5), (a)(7), (b)(5). The problems arising from the application of anti-
lapse statutes to powers of appointment are discussed extensively by Susan French. See Susan
F. French, Application of Antilapse Statutes to Appointments Made by Will, 53 WASH. L. REV.
405 (1978); Susan F. French, Exercise of Powers of Appointment: Should Intent to Exercise be
Inferred From a General Disposition of Property?, 1979 DUKE L.J. 747. The 1990 UPC anti-
lapse provision in regard to powers of appointment is discussed by Sheldon Kurtz. See Sheldon
F. Kurtz, Powers of Appointment Under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code: What was Done-
What Remains to be Done, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1151 (1992).
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ent or who are testator's step children; when applicable a substitute
gift for the devisee's descendants is created.13 7 It not only applies to
wills, but also to life insurance retirement plans, accounts payable on
death, and other transfers-upon-death registrations.13 The latter ap-
plication means that a formality requirement has been added to non-
testamentary and other will substitutes. Because the 1990 UPC, if
enacted, would apply to wills of persons who die after the enactment
date,13e these additional or changed rules may result in the denial of
testamentary intent.
14 0
In the comment to section 2-603, the justification for the reversal
of the presumption is based upon two primary arguments."' First,
the statute is said to be remedial in that it favors family"42 and thus
deserves broad interpretation and, second, the issue has been liti-
gated enough to have-a firm rule. 143 It seems that neither argument
justifies the reversal of the presumption. For example, if there is an
attempt by a testator to express his or her preferences as to the ap-
137 See U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991).
131 See id. § 2-706.
'3 Id. § 2-801(b)(1).
If enacted, the 1990 UPC would, in effect, require that all persons review their beneficiary
designation. Although reviewing one's estate plan is an activity to be encouraged, the section
may, nevertheless, cause those who fail to review or alter their plans to encounter unexpected
and unintended distributional results. Professors Halbach and Waggoner concede that this sec-
tion should be given prospective application if existing law is changed. See Halbach & Wag-
goner, supra note 62, at 1114.
"' Professors Halbach and Waggoner express additional reasons for the rule in their discus-
sion of § 2-603. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 62, at 1109-15. Notwithstanding this
supplementation, the bottom line is that it is based on a hypothetical client who has an inade-
quate lawyer and who has never thought of the problem of lapse. Maybe we should investigate
whether this person really exists and whether the rule conforms to the average person's desires
and expectations. On this score, Halbach and Waggoner admit controversy. Id. at 1112-14.
.4 Professor Fellows prefers a generalized imputed intent to favor family. She states:
Imputing to property owners an intent to prefer family is likely to achieve most prop-
erty owners' donative wishes. Undoubtedly, the state's preference for family places at risk
nontraditional distribution schemes that exclude some family members in favor of other
family or nonfamily members. The interplay of individualized and generalized imputed
intent responds to that risk by presuming that a property owner intended a traditional
scheme that most other property owners would prefer, but allowing a party to rebut the
presumption with objective evidence establishing a nontraditional plan. This method of
imputing intent balances messily, but effectively, contradictory individual values by rais-
ing barriers to donative freedom, while only rarely prohibiting its exercise.
Fellows, supra note 97, at 613.
Courts have disagreed on whether antilapse statutes are remedial or in derogation of common
law. Compare Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (antilapse statutes
are to be strictly construed) with Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Berenblum, 221 A.2d 758 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (antilapse statutes are to be liberally construed).
143 The comment to § 2-603 notes the conflict among the cases and cites several examples.
See U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991).
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plication of the statute, the first argument logically fails. It is argua-
ble that when an expression of this nature is made, it should be given
greater credence than the presumption of the statute.14 ' Although the
antilapse statute is remedial, it does not attempt to overcome ex-
pressed intent. Moreover, it is legitimately arguable that any expres-
sion of intent should overcome a statutory presumption. Although
there is disagreement,4 " and the issue has not been litigated in all
states, there is significant authority for recognizing that an expres-
sion that mere survivorship is required rebuts the antilapse presump-
tion."4" Certainly, there should be some preference for persons named
in the will over those not named.
The second argument, concerning the large amount of litigation
over the survivorship issue, could have easily been resolved by mak-
ing the opposite presumption 1'7-that is, confirm the cases that have
held mere statements of survivorship to rebut the statute. This would
place the burden of production on those who wish to show that the
statement does not rebut the statute. It seems that when the testator
has expressed some indication of intent, the burden should be on the
challenger to overcome such indication. The conjectural argument
that testators or lawyers have not thought about this issue does not
justify the presumption. The presumption could logically go against
the application of the statute rather than in favor of it and still em-
phasize to draftsmen the problems that must be dealt with concern-
ing survivorship.
, The existence of a contrary intent in wills that contain mere expressions of the need for
survivorship is addressed in the comment to § 2-706. The comment criticizes "[liawyers who
believe that the attachment of words of survivorship to a devise is a foolproof method of defeat-
ing an antilapse statute." Id. § 2-603 cmt. If there are a significant number of lawyers who
believe this, new § 2-603 may have serious consequences with wills already executed and not, or
unable to be, changed because of client indifference to law changes, client incompetence, or
attorney neglect, incompetence, or death. The malpractice threat to drafting attorneys who rely
on the contrary presumption is thoroughly discussed by Professor Begleiter. Martin D.
Begleiter, Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and the Malpractice Revolution, 59 TENN. L.
REV. 101, 12i-30 (1990). Limiting the application of the statute prospectively has been sug-
gested as a l.ossible cure for this problem. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 62, at 1114.
"I See U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991) (citing cases holding both for and against expressions of
intent overcoming statutory presumptions). Two commonly used texts on the subject matter
expressly state that a devise to a person, "if he survives," rebuts the application of the anti-
lapse statute's application. ATKINSON, supra note 87, §140, at 780; THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G.
HASKELL, PREFACE To ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 126 (2d ed. 1984).
1,6 See U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991) (citing cases and annotations holding in favor of the
supremacy of expressed intent).
1,7 When drafting language is key to the result, the purpose of the formality is reduced to
administrative convenience. Gaubatz, supra note 93, at 546. Professor Kurtz also mentions this
possibility. Kurtz, supra note 136, at 1189.
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In many cases under the antilapse statute, no actual intent will be
available and the court will be left with only the words of the will to
decipher. As mentioned, the antilapse statute's substitute devise pre-,
sumably applies unless a contrary intent is found. When a testator
uses survivorship words, however, a presumption stand-off arises: the
presumption of statutory application against an expression of con-
trary intent. In such situations presumptions are frequently and
properly used, in a sense, to break the tie. The draftsmen correctly
contend that something has to be said to break the new tie and they
opted for testator's "express contrary intent" to rebut the statutory
presumption but for testator's "mere words of survivorship" to not
rebut it.14
Without relevant extrinsic evidence to explain testator's actual in-
tent, however, we are flying blind. In these situations we should want
our presumptions and rules of construction to conform to the desires
of the average person because we have nothing else to go on. My con-
cern is that the Code's antilapse presumption concerning testator's
mere survivorship language does not necessarily conform to what an
average person would want or believe has been required. It seems to
me additional empirical evidence should be gathered before such dra-
matic changes are made.149
Analysis whether the presumption concerning survivorship lan-
guage conforms to average intent may depend on the class of devisee
involved in the devise. For example, it is one thing to say that most
persons probably want grandchildren to take by representation in the
place 'of deceased children and quite another to say they probably
want their nephews and nieces to take by representation in the place
of deceased brothers and sisters. If I were to interpret a will, for ex-
ample, that provided: "I give $100,000 to my surviving brothers and
sisters, and the residue to X charity,"' 50 I would conclude that the
"4 See supra note 135.
,, There have been several such studies. See, e.g., Allison Dunham, The Method, Process
and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 241 (1963); Mary L.
Fellows, et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succes-
sion Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319. The relevance of these studies
cited in support of the 1990 changes is questionable. The studies have been over cited. Al-
though legitimate as to their intended scope, they should not be expanded beyond their original
designs or purposes.
"' The illustration raises two antilapse issues under the 1990 provision. The first is whether
descendants of a predeceased brother or sister take under the section if one or more brothers or
sisters survive. The second is whether descendants of predeceased brothers and sisters can take
if no brother or sister survives or whether the charity takes instead. If the words "surviving
brothers and sisters" are mere words of survivorship, the presumption of § 2-603(b)(3) would
apply and the descendants of predeceased brothers and sisters might share with surviving
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testator did not want nephews and nieces to take the devise under
the antilapse statute unless all brothers and sisters died and unless
the charity was incapable of taking. On the other hand, in interpret-
ing a similar clause to testator's'children, I might reach the opposite
conclusion and allow descendants of predeceased children to take by
representation in the place of deceased children and to the exclusion
of the charity.' This distinction between various classes of relatives
is more likely to conform to average intent than the Code's relational
umbrella approach. 152 Maybe the presumption is not wrong but has
been extended to too many persons. The antilapse statute in its de-
sirable attempt to cover a large number of relatives may be at fault
for not recognizing real distinctions between the relational categories.
From an inheritance standpoint, one's descendants are vastly differ-
ent from one's collaterals and the statutory presumption should
probably recognize this.' 3
brothers and sisters and take in lieu of the charity. U.P.C. § 2-603(b)(3) (1991). I doubt that
this result would conform to the intent of most testators but maybe I am wrong. Certainly, no
current survey of testators exists that will guide us in this matter.
It is also somewhat anomalous that merely by changing the survivorship language, one may
change the answer. For example, if the devises stated, "I give my estate to my brothers and
sisters, or to the survivor of them, but if none survives, to X charity," or "I give my estate to
my surviving brothers and sisters, but if none survives, to X charity," the antilapse presump-
tion may not apply because there are alternate gifts. U.P.C. § 2-603(b)(4) (1991). It seems to me
that these distinctions are artificial because the above phrases are as subject to the evils of
lousy lawyering as are mere words of survivorship.
"' Professor French proposes a statute that distinguishes between lineal descendants and
other relatives and persons when survival language is used. See French, supra note 134, at 371-
73. In the case of lineal decedents, the antilapse feature of the statute is presumed to apply
unless a contrary intent is shown by extrinsic evidence. Id. When survival language is used in
reference to other relatives (collateral) and to persons, lapse occurs unless "persuasive evi-
dence" shows testator did not intend the devise to lapse, or to apply lapse would permit a
disinherited person or the state to take. Id. at 372-73. As Professor French warns:
The major conceptual flaw in current antilapse statutes is that they assume that lapse
always produces intent-defeating distributions, or that lapse of all devises to defined bene-
ficiaries always produces intent-defeating distributions. ...
The purpose of the antilapse statutes should be to provide an alternative disposition of
the property that will further the testator's dispositive plan.
Id. at 373.
152 The antilapse provision covers all devisees who take from the will and who are grandpar-
ents or descendants of grandparents. See U.P.C. § 2-603 (1991). Although this broad pool of
persons works for intestacy, it may be too extensive for certain will interpretations.
"B' Minor changes to § 2-603(b)(3) would eliminate most of the reasons for my opposition. If
the new presumption concerning words of survivorship only applied to devisees who are de-
scendants of the testator, the presumption would conform to what I would submit are the
desires of most people who would evaluate this issue. When words of survivorship are used in a
devise to the other covered relatives under the UPC's grandparent and their descendants um-
brella, I would urge that a rebuttable presumption of lapse should apply if the devisee does not
survive the testator.
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I urge that additional inquiries into what most people think should
be done in these circumstances be conducted. We might find that
most think that language of survivorship would preclude use of the
antilapse statute. If that is the case, then why reverse the presump-
tion? If such is not the case, then the 1990 antilapse provision is cor-
rect. As it stands now, however, the necessary' empirical research has
not been conducted. The 1990 UPC can assist in clarifying a con-
fused area of law by putting the presumption either way. Potentially
reasonable expectations of the parties may be destroyed no matter
which way the presumption lies. This is not a moral issue where there
is a right or wrong. So long as a testator has control over who'takes
the property from the testator, this type of decision is within private
control and not one to be set by public policy. I am not against the
provision as much as I am not convinced by its supportive
arguments. 54
VII. CONCLUSION
As with any project of the 1990 UPC's magnitude, continual review
and revision is necessary. Despite its imperfection, it is the best legis-
lative model: both comprehensively and individually. State legisla-
tures need to overcome provincialism -and recognize the changes that
have occurred in the area of property ownership and transfer. Not
only has property ownership changed from an emphasis upon real
property to personal property, but even the type of personal property
has changed. We live in a mobile, diverse'society with a wide range of
familial relationships. People believe that property transfers are pri-
vate transactions not requiring continual court or government regula-
tion, supervision, or intervention. -Probate law needs to recognize
these realities.
Several attempts at revision have not stimulated much positive re-
sponse. Issuance of the universal succession provisions and its inde-
pendent self-standing. act has not been accepted by any state at this
point. Obviously, there is still strong resistance to total noncourt
"6 Unlike the statutory presumptions contained in the advancement, satisfaction, and suc-
cession contract sections, this presumption is correctable with extrinsic evidence after the dece-
dent's death. See U.P.C. § 2-603 cmt. (1991). Notwithstanding the liberal extrinsic evidence
rule, the mere fact that it imposes the risk of litigation in circumstances where there is some
indication of intent is an unfair burden and thus, in effect, imposes a formality of greater clar-
ity of language upon draftsmen. Is this form over substance? The evidentiary burden might
better be put on those who contend-the intent is wrongfully expressed rather than on those who
rely on a reasonable meaning of what is expressed. An expression of intent is worth something
even if it is not perfectly clear in meaning.
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processes for succession at death. Despite the resistance, non-Code
states need to seriously consider the 1990 UPC. It offers much more
than current state law. If the Code is imperfect, that is no justifica-
tion for ignoring it or rejecting it out of hand. The 1990 UPC is
clearly a dynamic instrument of reform deserving wide support.
In this Aiticle I have attempted to review the past and to offer
some suggestions as to how communication between interested advo-
cates, the drafting processes and result, and the entire 1990 UPC can
be substantively improved in the future. If these efforts are taken, I
believe acceptance of the 1990 UPC will increase significantly.
